Original Author: Pepper (X: @off_thetarget)
Tl'dr Conclusion
- "External Market" (fools are forming LPs on Raydium) uses their own chips -> Their chips are all obtained from the bonding curve, and the external market chips are severely undervalued.
Optimal Strategy: Buy $send, Buy External Market $super, Do not brush.
If the external market is above your harvesting cost price, then you can brush. The more you brush in the same time (5 min), the less points you get. Reduce high-frequency operations, find the time when Asians are sleeping. After getting the points, you must buy immediately, do not delay as it will get more expensive. Brush early, the flywheel cannot stop.
The new model meme platform does not want platform tokens, but instead exchanges your expectations for platform tokens for part of your transaction fee income. The number of $super tokens that can be obtained will decrease, and the price of $super will increase. The destruction and point redemption are related, and the points are controlled by a function of trading volume + number of traders.
The $super of the "External Market" is the expected value/cost line of the first batch of $super harvesters in the "Internal Market." When the car starts to accelerate (n = 4-8), the "Internal Market" MC will take off and exceed the value of the "External Market," which is severely mismatched due to insufficient liquidity. The "External Market" is likely to be pulled up (just remember that the two bonding curves are completely different: one is x * y = k, the other is x^n * y = K). The formulas are different, the calculation methods are different, and the expectations are different; the harvesters cannot calculate it.
Detailed Breakdown: Misconceptions about "Internal and External Markets/Infinite Markets" Market Value
1. Let's first look at the ordinary "External Market" under the AMM mechanism.
Most previous AMM mechanisms calculated using x * y = K, meaning the value of K fluctuates with the values of x and y, generally forming two pairs. Here, x and y represent the "inventory" of two types of tokens, and k is the liquidity parameter. During each transaction, the inventory changes while k remains constant. During each process of adding or removing liquidity, k increases or decreases accordingly.
In summary, decreased liquidity -> price decreases -> market dies.
Forced liquidity demand increases.
However, @_superexchange has a bonding curve that is infinite and does not distinguish between internal and external markets.
2. Comparison of Pumpfun's Internal Market and Super Exchange
The bonding curve of Pumpfun is different; although it also references the AMM model, the joint curve of the virtual market is different.
I referred to a previous analysis article:
"http://PUMP.FUN pricing system has a pre-positioned virtual pool, with the number of $Sol in the virtual pool being x0, and the total number of tokens being y0. By collecting data on the number of $SOL purchased by platform users and the corresponding tokens obtained, and fitting it to the x*y=k formula, the pre-positioned virtual pool is found to have 30 $SOL and 1,073,000,191 tokens, with an initial k value of 32,190,005,730, making the price of each token 0.000000028 $SOL."
Before graduation, we divided Pumpfun into several areas, assuming 20-40% is one area, 40%-80% is another area, and 80%-100% (graduation) is another area.
20%-40%: The price formula is y=k/x, early price liquidity changes: dy/dx=−k/x, meaning when x is small, the price is sensitive to purchases, and liquidity is low.
40%-80%: As x increases, liquidity remains low, and small purchases lead to rapid price increases.
80%-Graduation: |dydx| increases, purchasing a small amount (x) leads to a sharp drop in (y), unable to support large capital. A common manifestation is that when the internal market approaches 80K, bots quickly dump, which can drop to 20-30K, showing pool behavior.
Summary: Forced liquidity demand increases.
Now let's look at Super Exchange.
Their formula is x^n * y = k, where n has 7 levels, ranging from 32 to 1.
When N = 32,
The liquidity change is: liquidity change: dydx=−n⋅kxn+1. When n = 32, |dydx| is extremely small, and the price is insensitive to (x), indicating high liquidity.
In simple terms, buying x does not affect the price and continuously "increases" liquidity.
When N = 8-4,
Liquidity change: |dydx|=n⋅kxn+1, as n decreases, |dydx| increases but is suppressed by xn+1, stabilizing market depth.
In simple terms, as n decreases and x increases, the price starts to push up, and depth stabilizes.
When N = 1,
Liquidity change: liquidity change: |dydx|=kx^2, as (x) increases, |dydx| decreases, stabilizing market depth.
In simple terms, it can support larger capital entering and exiting without significantly affecting depth.
Summary: Forced liquidity demand increases.
免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。
