During the seven days of the National Day holiday, many KOLs in the Chinese cryptocurrency circle began to publicly announce a new operation with great fanfare:

Exiting the crypto ecosystem and transferring a large amount of funds to the A-shares.

Seeing this operation, I still want to remind our readers:

If you are very confident that you are a genius in operations and can accurately grasp the upcoming market trends in both the crypto ecosystem and A-shares, then you can emulate this operation—perfectly utilizing the rhythms of different investment markets to achieve substantial profits. Otherwise, I suggest you proceed with caution.

I believe that in the crypto ecosystem, many readers, especially younger ones, have spent much more time navigating and honing their skills than in A-shares, and they are far more familiar with and knowledgeable about the crypto ecosystem than A-shares.

Simply abandoning a familiar market due to the violent fluctuations in another market you are not very familiar with, and recklessly entering an unfamiliar territory, would truly be like "sheep entering a tiger's den."

Among these KOLs, many usually look down on A-shares completely. However, this 180-degree turnaround is not surprising to me, as there are even more outrageous examples—such as those internationally renowned institutional investors.

Today, I will mention one of the most famous and well-known: BlackRock.

Its CEO, Larry Fink, mentioned in an earlier interview (in essence): "When I talk to Chinese executives, there is a fear that we (A-shares) have not yet reached the bottom. Could this be the bottom for China?"

This statement reveals BlackRock's deep concerns about A-shares. Therefore, we all know what BlackRock's final operation in A-shares was—tearfully cutting losses and withdrawing from A-shares.

When this operation was exposed, I remember that major domestic media created a famous joke about BlackRock's investment in A-shares: "Can't buy enough, simply can't buy enough."

However, on September 24, after the central government introduced a series of stimulus measures, and as a series of overseas capital became "restless" in the face of A-shares' rise, BlackRock surprisingly began to pay attention to Chinese stocks again—upgrading its rating from "neutral" to "overweight."

This shift is indeed quite rapid and agile for such a large institution.

Who says big companies are slow to react? I see BlackRock's response is incredibly quick, its speed and agility are not inferior to that of a startup.

In an article on September 26, I wrote the following:

"…… Among these people, there are two types of views on the upcoming market:

The first type: A-shares have completely emerged from the bottom, and from now on, the stock market will move forward in waves.

The second type: There may be a more tragic final drop ahead, which could very likely break the previous low, leaving most who still have hope in tears and heartbroken. Only after this final drop is completed will A-shares experience a vigorous bull market.

I am now curious: If the aforementioned 'second type' situation occurs, and this final tragic drop indeed comes, how will BlackRock change its rating on Chinese stocks at that time?

For Wall Street institutions like BlackRock, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger often mention them in their shareholder Q&A sessions, and their tone is quite dismissive.

If you have seen the American movie "The Wolf of Wall Street," you can deeply understand this kind of "disdain."

In the movie, although the Wolf of Wall Street works on Wall Street, his ability to make money does not rely on investment philosophy, nor on values and ways of thinking, but on sales techniques.

His key ability is to make his clients believe that the investment products he promotes have "potential" and can "appreciate." As for whether those investment products really have "potential" and can "appreciate," that is not his concern; perhaps they really have potential to appreciate, or perhaps they are completely worthless.

In short, when he wants to promote his investment products, he has a whole bunch of "reasons" and a lot of "data" to convince clients that the investment products truly have a bright future.

On Wall Street, there are countless such institutions.

Now let's look back at the case of BlackRock.

In Larry Fink's statements, he repeatedly mentions the concept of "bottom fishing." Just based on this point, he and Buffett and Munger are completely on different levels in terms of investment.

Because bottom fishing is basically a matter of luck.

Anyone who operates with the idea of "bottom fishing" is not investing but speculating. And speculation can only be temporary and not sustainable.

Now let's talk about the A-share stocks that BlackRock bought previously.

If it was a stock of a very good company, it is clear that under that macro environment, I think the price was unlikely to be overvalued. And for a stock that is not overvalued but is very valuable, the lower the price, the more it should be a buying opportunity. But BlackRock's operation clearly proves that it does not understand the value of the company.

If it was a stock of a very bad company, purely looking for opportunities to sell the company to raise money for listing. If BlackRock bought such a company, it proves that its vision is truly questionable—failing to understand a company it invested in, or even not knowing it was a fraudulent company.

If BlackRock initially left A-shares because it felt that the fundamentals of A-shares, the entire macro environment, and even certain sensitive aspects had serious problems, then even today, after the central government has introduced these measures, the aspects it was worried about have not changed significantly. So why did its viewpoint change immediately?

If BlackRock initially left A-shares not because of the fundamentals but simply because it believed A-shares needed stimulus measures and from the information it had, it saw no hope for stimulus measures to be introduced, then it proves that the information it has is problematic, especially regarding the so-called assessments of future trends by those "Chinese executives" mentioned by Larry Fink. And such people are actually BlackRock's executives, which shows the level of trend assessment at the top of this company.

In summary, from various perspectives, BlackRock resembles the typical Wall Street "sales" company depicted in "The Wolf of Wall Street," relying on promoting its financial products rather than being the kind of investment company we imagine—relying on its investment capabilities.

But interestingly, many such companies are seen as "high-end," "authoritative," and "investment" companies in the eyes of the general public.

Can such companies become objects for us investors to learn from in terms of investment? Of course not.

But do their so-called "research reports" have value? Of course, they do.

We can use their research reports to assess the potential space of an investment market and possible user groups, thereby evaluating the potential upper limit of that market in the future.

I often see readers leaving comments like this at the end of articles:

I am a novice, I don't understand XX, so I can only trust the views of XXX (especially some institutions).

As time and experience grow, I believe these readers will one day realize: those XXX (institutions) they trust are often not as reliable as themselves in many cases.

So investment is not about blindly believing others or any institutions; ultimately, it relies on oneself, having independent thinking, and having one's own investment logic.

In familiar fields, we can fully understand more than those institutions, be more profound than those institutions, set up our own strategies in advance for the institutions to enter the market to enhance the overall market space, and then we can reap the benefits.

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